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ARCHIVAL SECURITY 
A PERSONAL AND CIRCUMSTANTI AL VI EW 
Edmund Berkeley, Jr. 
~ find my involvement in archival security most ironical, 
since my chief "background and training" in the subject has 
been to be the head of an archival agency which suffered a 
major theft. Had I been given a choice, I should have chosen 
almost any other method of learning more about this important 
and complex subject. Certainly I do not recommend my "train-
ing program" in archival security to anyone else! As a 
training method, its chief recommendation is that the subject 
captures your almost total attention for months and is never 
far out of your consciousness thereafter. Living for over 
two years with the ramifications of our theft also has made 
me intensely aware of the major national problem with archi-
val theft. 
Archivists, of course, have been concerned from 
ancient times with security, since preservation of the 
materials in their charge is their most important duty. In 
the not-so-ancient times of the early 1960s when I joined 
the profession, as a member of the Archives Division of the 
Virginia State Library, I and my colleagues were taught a 
good deal about our responsibility to protect and preserve 
the materials in our care. Perhaps more emphasis was placed 
on protection from theft than on other kinds of preservation 
in my on-the-job training, for the Barrow Restoration Shop 
was adjacent to the staff workroom. The Shop handled the 
other sorts of preservation problems for us. The late 
Mr. Berkeley is Curator of Manuscripts and Univer-
sity Archivist at the University of Virginia. In addition 
he serves as Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Se-
curity Program of the Society of American Archivists . This 
paper is adapted from his talk at the Society of Georgia 
Archivists' Workshop, November 21, 1975. 
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William J. Van Schreeven, then the state archivist, con-
stantly reminded the junior archivists who had charge of 
the reading room that we must always be alert to the pos-
sibility of theft. I remember several occasions upon which 
he told the staff of a person or persons suspected of having 
stolen things from other institutions; very often he had a 
description of the suspects, and once, a sketch provided by 
an artistically-talented archivist. 
Nevertheless, none of these warnings or stories 
seemed real to me then. The known thefts had all happened 
far away from Virginia, and somehow we seemed safe and secure. 
Most of our patrons were ladies and gentlemen, and genealo-
gists over-impressed with the importance of their family 
lineage were a much more inunediate problem. 
Now it is 1975. Two Virginia institutions--one of 
them my own, and the other the institution for which I 
formerly worked--have been victims of thefts. The Virginia 
State Library has been fortunate in apprehending, prosecuting, 
and convicting its thief. Sadly, the University. of Virginia 
Library has no solid leads to its thief or thieves after two 
years of investigation. These stories are not unique and 
can be matched or overshadowed in any gathering of archivists 
or curators. 
The theft from the University of Virginia Library 
is interesting, perhaps, in that it apparently was an "in-
side job," that is, one in which there were no visible signs 
of breaking and entering. · We were not aware that we had been 
robbed for a very long time, and this made the work of the 
police extremely difficult. Reviewing the circumstances, I 
find that the first "incident" of importance was the casual 
discovery by a member of the departmental faculty that one 
major item was not in its proper filing location when she 
went to get it to show to some visitors. She reported the 
fact, and we began a routine search for the document. 
I use the word "routine" advisedly because we were 
in no way alarmed. We do misfile and misplace things occa-
sionally; with more than 9,100,000 items in 12,000 separate 
collections, we should be insufferable paragons if we did 
not. Thus, when one item was reported missing, it was con-
sidered misfiled and a routine happenstance. Because the 
item was an historically important one, we did make a number 
of searches for it, and I mentioned to the university 
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librarian that we could not locate it. Various staff members 
conducted searches over a period of some weeks. When they 
failed to find the item, I decided I should look myself. 
Hunting through the vault filing area where the missing item 
should have been, I realized that at least one and possibly 
two other items were missing as well. 
Mental alarm bells began to ring, because never have 
we misfiled more than one item from the same filing area. But 
we faced a serious problem in trying to determine whether we 
had misfiled the items or another cause accounted for their 
absence. 
We never have had in our department what librarians 
would call a shelf list--a card file or list of the items that 
should be found upon inspection of a particular shelf or 
filing area. Such lists were not compiled because they could 
not materially improve our very good control systems for 
locating material. We sincerely regretted not having a shelf 
list of the contents of the vault, a rather large area of more 
than 900 square feet on two levels. Our department houses a 
considerable quantity of material in the vault, which it shares 
with the Rare Book Department of the Library. In this special 
area are kept our collection of over 3,000 Jefferson papers, 
the William Faulkner manuscripts, and many valuable literary 
manuscripts from the Barrett Library of American Literature. 
In addition it holds materials requiring security but which 
have no intrinsic value, such as student records from the 
registrar's office and minutes of the Board of Visitors. 
Without describing our existing control arrangements 
in detail, suffice it to say that we do have a good working 
system for locating material in our custody, and that from 
the folders comprising this system we were able to prepare 
a shelf list of the manuscripts that should have been found 
in the vault. Compiling this list occupied the majority of 
the members of the faculty and staff for several days and 
the clerical staff for nearly a week of typing. 
Once this shelf list had been typed onto three-by-
five-inch cards, we began a systematic check of the contents 
of the vault. Some members of the faculty labored at the 
task every day. But we soon discovered that such work can-
not be done for more than a few hours at a time, because the 
worker becomes sleepy, inattentive, and vocally bored. This 
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librarian informed of our activity, but even at this time, I 
felt there was no evidence of anything more than our own 
carelessness. 
Several weeks later, a patron requested a photocopy 
of a George Washington letter which he had placed in the 
department on deposit. A staff member went to the vault to 
retrieve the letter, could not find it, and immediately 
notified me. I in turn at once ordered the entire depart-
mental faculty and some of the library assistants to join the 
searching in the vault. By late afternoon we had discovered 
the major disappearance of materials from the autograph col-
lection, whence the majority of items were stolen. I reported 
the loss to my superior, together with my opinion that a theft 
had indeed occurred. That night, I wrote out the details of 
all of the incidents and our actions in response. 
The unhappy news of the many missing items was re-
ported to the university president. One ·of the first things 
we were asked to do before the police were contacted was to 
search all of our collections to be sure that we had not mis-
filed the ini.ssing materials elsewhere. A principal reason for 
ordering such a massive search was the discovery that our in-
surance policy stated that the company was not obligated if 
the only indication of a loss was an "inventory shortage." 
Since we had no evidence of breaking and entering, the company 
has steadfastly maintained the position of its policy, and the 
question may have to be resolved in court. (I urge archivists 
to read carefully the insurance policies that protect them in 
cases of loss and be knowledgeable to what extent they are 
covered.) 
The order to make the extensive search of our entire 
holdings was no blithe one issued by an administrator unaware 
of what the command entailed for us. The university presi-
dent's executive assistant spent some twenty-five years in 
the position I now hold. Thus he knew exactly what was in-
volved and how things could be misfiled. 
As I look back on the accomplishments of the faculty 
and staff in response to that administrative order, I am still 
impressed. Each person was given a copy of the list of missing 
materials, a list which ran to over four pages and which had 
virtually to be memorized. All of the members of the depart-
mental faculty, and most of the library assistants--nine 
people in all--were relieved of other duties and assigned to 
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searching teams. We left a small staff for the reading room. 
All departmental leave, other than sick leave (none was taken), 
was cancelled. The searchers opened and checked every Hol-
linger box, oversized box, records center box, package, and 
other carton on more than two miles of shelving, as well as 
every map tray, file drawer, and other storage container in 
our charge. 
This was in no sense an "inventory" as an insurance 
company uses that word. There was no attempt to check system-
atically the contents item by item of each container against 
a container or shelf list. We do have many such lists, but 
we could not take the time to carry on a search of that depth. 
Instead, we attempted to spot the file units--<laguerreotype 
case and folders--which disappeared with the missing letters. 
I felt certain, as I told the librarians, that we 
would find none of the missing items during this search. 
While we certainly do make mistakes and misfile items, our 
control system is a good one and adhered to by the staff. 
There were no flags in place of any of the missing items 
as there should have been had the items been withdrawn 
legitimately and subsequently misfiled. The massive search 
confirmed the effectiveness of the control system. We 
found very few materials out of place, and almost every 
instance represented an error made years ago. 
During the period that we were checking the manu-
script collections, our colleagues in the Rare Book Depart-
ment conducted a shelf-list reading of the books kept in the 
vault. This search would have revealed eventually that two 
books by university alumnus Edgar Allen Poe--TamerZane and 
AZ Aaraaf, Tamer Zane and Minor Poems--were missing, but a 
patron's request for them before the shelf readers reached 
their filing location revealed this additional theft. 
All employees of the two departments, twenty-two 
persons, knew that we probably had been robbed. We asked 
them to keep the news quiet while we carried on our searches, 
and they responded beautifully. No word of the loss left 
the two departments for the several months of searching 
and other actions preceding the public announcement in early 
December, 1973. Looking back on this period, I think one of 
the best actions that we took was to keep the personnel of 
the two departments as fully informed as possible. While 
much stress and apprehension existed, openness helped to 
alleviate these problems to some extent. 
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The completion of our fruitless searches in the 
Manuscripts Department, coupled with the discovery of the 
loss from the Rare Book Department of the two extremely rare 
Poe books, left the University no alternative but to accept 
the fact that we had been robbed. The university police 
thereupon were summoned to investigate the case. They were 
highly critical of the fact that we had delayed so long in 
bringing them into the case. Knowing something of police 
work, I appreciate this attitude. But an inside job is 
insidious. One is unsure that a theft has occurred, as there 
always is the possibility of a filin~ error. Another pos-
sible explanation of the missing material is that a dis-
gruntled staff member may have hidden them to cause trouble 
and grief. And if there has been a theft, the likely suspects 
are those persons with whom you work every day. That one of 
them has stolen materials is an awful prospect to contemplate, 
especially if you have hired many of them and worked with the 
others for years, as I had. 
By the nature of our work, the head of an archival 
agency must have implicit faith in the integrity of the staff 
of his agency. In no other way can the agency be run without 
almost. insurmountable administrative problems. While I do 
believe that candidates for archival positions must be in-
vestigated, particularly by speaking with former employers 
and the persons listed as references, the truth of the matter 
is that even a full field investigation by the F.B.I. would 
not guarantee that someone might not later steal material. 
The Daniel Ellsberg-Pentagon Papers case might be cited among 
others; trusted employees, whose motives are said to be "high-
er" in such cases, presumably are the ones who keep columnists 
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten on the pages of our daily news-
papers. 
The psychological effects of an apparent inside theft 
are great. The personnel of our two departments inevitably 
wondered about each other, and the resulting tensions hurt 
morale. The request, early in the new year, that we all 
submit to polygraph (lie detector) examination brought the 
nadir of this tension. Persons who work in libraries and 
archives rarely are acquainted with police methods and with 
the polygraph. I was, as I have a brother who has been a 
policeman. Still the request came ·as a shock. 
I say "request" because it was exactly that. We 
each had the theoretical right to refuse to take the test, 
8 
6
Georgia Archive, Vol. 4 [1976], No. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/georgia_archive/vol4/iss1/2
but as you can imagine, the pressure to submit to it was 
compelling . So many questions about the test came to me 
and my colleague in charge of the Rare Book Department that 
we ran out of answers and appealed to the university admin-
istration for help. The head of the university police, a 
former F.B.I. agent, was sent to meet with both staffs. He 
was only partially successful in alleviating fears, for a 
few of the staff vented their frustrations on him with 
antagonistic and skillful questioning. 
Several persons consulted lawyers who advised their 
clients not to take the test. One staff member, married to 
a law student, spent hours in the law library reading every-
thing she could find on the polygraph and the law. Ultimately, 
I believe almost everyone submitted to the test, even some 
who at first had refused. The pressure to do so was enormous. 
It took many months for morale to recover. But when 
no one was arrested, the staff began to relax. Moreover, as 
rumors circled the two departments after visits from the police, 
it became apparent that there was -at least one way in which 
the inside job could have been committed by an outsider. Once 
this was known, and since the police had not solved the crime, 
things slowly returned to normal. 
If it is true that librarians and archivists rarely 
are acquainted with police and their procedures, the reverse 
is equally so. We had to educate the police in our methods 
and approaches before they really could conduct a thorough 
investigation. And often thereafter as I conversed with 
various officers, I realized they did not yet understand 
rather basic archival procedures, and I would have to begin 
again. After this experience, I suggest that archivists, 
curators, and librarians attempt to educate their local 
police by inviting them to tour the archival agency. Many 
police departments have public relations programs and will 
be glad to send officers to the agency as consultants on 
security. Such consultations provide good opportunities 
for the education of the police. 
Since our theft, we have made several changes in 
our security arrangements, some of which originated with the 
police, some of which we thought of ourselves, and others of 
which were joint efforts. Many of these are simple adjust-
ments, not at all costly for the benefits they bring. 
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Before the theft, all members of the faculty and sta 
holding library assistant rank were allowed access to the 
vault. Faculty members knew the combination since they oc-
casionally needed to open the vault after field trips or 
when working on Saturday. The police were highly critical 
of this generous access policy, and we· were ordered by the 
administration to limit severely the number of persons having 
the vault combination and access. We reduced the number having 
the combination to two in each department, and this has worked 
well in practice. One of us always seems to be around to open 
the vault in the morning. During the day, the inner doors, 
which open with a key, remain locked, and only those persons 
with access privileges may obtain the key and go in and out. 
We regularly change the vault combination--which we now know 
how to do ourselves--and always after one of the combination 
holders leaves the faculty. 
Originally we tried to confine access to the vault 
to the same four persons who had the combination, but this 
proved impractical. As the four persons who have the com-
bination are the curators of the departments and their chief 
deputies, I and my opposite number soon found that we were 
spending considerable time as vault "go-fers." Eventually, 
we persuaded the administration to adopt our present policy 
of permitting vault privileges to all faculty members of the 
two departments with at least three years service on our 
staff. 
A second criticism made by the police was that we 
had no record of vault entry. We now maintain a book near 
the vault door and log each visit: its purpose, times of 
entrance and egress, and the name of the person making the 
visit. I am afraid that none of us see the benefit of the 
log since it is so easily falsified, but it makes the police 
happy. 
Another change has been refinement of the shelf list 
of the manuscripts kept in the vault. To enable us to identify 
these items as ours should any question arise, our cataloger 
has prepared careful and complete descriptions of all the 
bound manuscripts and slip cases. We pursued the check of 
materials there, performing item-by-item inventories of large 
collections such as the Faulkner and Jefferson papers. This 
took months, but was worth the time for the peace of mind 
resulting. We found nothing else unaccounted for. 
10 
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The general security of the areas of the library 
building we occupy has been strengthened by reassessment of 
the system of locks. In the two special collections depart-
ments, there are a total of fifty-one doors with locks. All 
staff and student assistants have access to the key that works 
the regular locks. They cannot move about the departments 
without it. We have added to each of the critical entrance-
exit doors, as well as to certain others, an extra--a dead 
bolt--lock. Not only have the dead bolt locks been obtained 
from a different company than our regular locks, but the key 
which works them is issued to but four faculty in each depart-
ment and to the librarian and associate librarian. We would 
prefer to constrict this number, but in case of an emergency, 
such as a fire, we must be able to get into our areas quickly. 
We also re-key this special set of locks routinely every six 
months. 
Our reading room has received a great deal of security 
attention, for we realize that we are more likely to be "hit" 
in it than in any other area of our operation. We are fortu-
nate that the room has but one exterior door, by which all 
visitors must enter and leave, because this makes for good 
security. The door is located in the middle of one long wall 
of the thirty-by-ninety-foot room. A large control desk, 
some ten feet long, faced the patron upon entering the room. 
Because a series of large structural columns run the length 
of the room on the wall opposite the door, readers' tables 
for years had been located in one long row along the wall 
with the door. A reader at the far table could be forty 
feet from the chief security person. Worse, when the clerk 
was at one end of the room, ample opportunity existed for 
a thief at the other end to slip a manuscript under a shirt 
or skirt. 
To combat this weakness in our layout, we rearranged 
the room concentrating all the readers' tables in one end. 
We moved the large control desk next to the entrance to the 
room and turned it ninety degrees so that the person sitting 
at it faces the readers. The size and length of this desk 
either forces anyone entering the room to stop at it or chan-
nels them to a new control desk we have created with a table-
desk combination. We added a staff desk in the readers' end 
of the reading room, but man it only when we are so busy that 
the control desk attendant cannot see all the readers. Staff 
activities formerly conducted between the structural columns 
are now concentrated in the end of the room opposite the 
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readers, removing the noise of staff enterprise from the pa-
trons. 
Our next step was to control entrance and egress 
from the area of readers' tables. Originally a length of 
chain I picked up at Sears sufficed, but this has been replaced 
with a theatre rope. Readers may enter or leave the research 
area only with permission. 
We have eliminated one possible way of removing manu-
scripts by requiring that ali brief cases, handbags, packages, 
portfolios, and the like, as well as coats, be checked before 
the patron enters the research area. We would ·prefer not to 
operate a check service, but we did not have the funds to buy, 
or the floor space to install, lockers with keys. 
One suggestion of the police reinforced an idea of 
our own. For some time we had wished to learn more about our 
patrons and their projects. Our registration book of many 
years had space only for name, permanent address, local ad-
dress, and a word or two about the project. We drew up a 
form which requires much more information about the patron 
and which enables us to accumulate some useful statistical 
information about the use of the collections. The police 
suggested that in addition we request personal identifica-
tion, such as a driver's license or a student identification 
card, which we now do, recording the numbers from the cards 
on the registration form. Our rules and regulations, which 
the patron is asked to read and sign to indicate his willing-
ness to comply, are printed on the recto. 
Another novelty for us is requiring patrons leaving 
the research area to submit all paper for inspection by the 
staff. If someone absolutely insists on taking a briefcase 
or a handbag to the table, we permit it only with the under-
standing that we will search the bag thoroughly before the 
person leaves. (We have granted such a request in but one or 
two instances.) 
Our final innovation affecting readers is a limita-
tion upon the amount of material they may have at a research 
table. Formerly, we might bring out a book truck full of 
material and park it beside the research table for the con-
venience of the patron. Now we limit to two the number of 
(Hollinger) boxes at a table, and we no longer leave book 
trucks in the readers' end of the room. Readers must turn 
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in the two boxes to the desk attendant to obtain two more. I 
still have reservations about allowing two boxes, for it is 
possible to erect a barricade with them behind which a reader 
may hide considerable activity. But reducing the limit would 
mean too much "running and fetching" for the reading room 
staff, and one must compromise at some point. 
Possibly the only perfect system for a manuscripts 
reading room would insist that each researcher strip to the 
skin, wear into the room a sheet furnished by the institution, 
use paper and pencil similarly provided to take his notes, use 
one piece of manuscript at a time, each one of which would be 
checked out and in individually, surrender all notes for in-
spection upon leaving the room, and submit to a body search 
when returning the sheet in the dressing room. Any system 
less than this will involve a certain amount of security risk 
for archivists and curators if they are to fulfill the charge 
of their profession to see that the materials in their charge 
are as widely used as their institutional regulations will 
permit. 
Archivists should see that their superiors understand 
these necessary risks. Then, should a theft occur, the report 
of it will meet with more understanding. Our situation at the 
University of Virginia was easier administratively because the 
librarian has taken an active interest in manuscripts during 
his professional career and has encouraged the growth of our 
department during his tenure at the university. It has been of 
benefit to us also that one of the university president's major 
advisers is a former curator of manuscripts, and that the presi-
dent himself is a Tennyson scholar who makes use of our facilities 
in his own work. Invite your superiors into your areas at every 
opportunity. Have coffee with them, lunch with them, and lobby 
them unmercifully. Send them copies of articles on manuscripts, 
rare books, and the special problems of both. But be sure they 
develop an appreciation of the concerns peculiar to the admin-
istration and security of archives and manuscripts. 
Attention has to be devoted, too, to special training 
for personnel who staff reading room desks. These persons 
must be the chief defense against theft, and they need instruc-
tion in procedures to follow should they observe, or suspect, 
a concealment of materials leading to a theft. 
Virginia State Archivist William Van Schreeven, who 
trained me, was one of those large men who have the knack of 
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moving quietly. On many occasions I have heard a question 
issuing from the empty air behind my right ear and jumped to 
find Van Schreeven standing there, a smile upon his face. He 
was particularly fond of pulling this stunt on those of us 
who manned the main desk in the reading room . While he ex-
pected us to take work to the desk, he insisted we learn to 
work with one eye on the readers in the room. His "sneak 
attacks" were one way of reminding us of our primary respon-
sibilities of service and security. 
I think we must do more to train our public service 
personnel to develop this technique of double vision. It is 
almost a cliche of manuscript work that our staffs are far 
too small to accomplish all that needs to be done. We expect 
our employees to write letters and perform other functions 
while working in our reading rooms . We must, I believe, less- , 
en these administrative demands. When weighed against the 
security responsibilities of these persons, the routine work 
should be secondary. Of course, the employees need to have 
enough work to accomplish so that they do not fall asleep 
like the guards in some reading rooms I have visited. 
For many years a clerical employee, backed by a 
faculty member, manned our main control desk in the reading 
room. This arrangement was adequate in a time when reader 
use was not particularly heavy and reader's questions un-
complicated. The clerk could handle our accessioning as 
well as the public service. But our reader use, climbing 
steadily, has increased seventy percent during the past 
four years. Combining the greater demands for service with 
the need for improved security, we found it desirable to 
rearrange job descriptions so that a library assistant is 
stationed at the main desk and assigned public service duties 
only. The person has the support of the public services archi-
vist in the room, as well as the stack supervisor. Also 
available in the staff end of the room are another faculty 
member and clerk, though their desks do not permit them to 
observe the readers. The library assistant is our main 
security person in the reading room, and for this reason, 
late last fall I asked the university's legal adviser to 
visit the room to review the security and to give us advice 
about the legal problems involved with accusing someone of 
removing material from the room. 
The attorney looked over the situation and immediately 
suggested that we post large and prominent signs forbidding 
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the removal of library material from the room. Such a state-
ment appears in our rules and regulations, but it is one of 
many paragraphs on a legal-sized sheet with lots of small 
type. The attorney felt someone could maintain that he did 
not read "all that stuff." We now have two large signs. One 
hangs prominently over the control desk facing the readers at 
their tables; the other is displayed on the inside of the doors 
through which one must pass to leave the room. 
Several days after this visit, the attorney sent us 
a sheet of suggestions and procedures for dealing with a per-
son that we might see, or suspect of, concealing something. 
Conduct yourself with utmost courtesy and def-
erence to the individual's right of privacy and 
free movement. • • • If one strongly suspects an 
item has been slipped inside the clothing, the in-
dividual should be delayed until the University De-
partment of Police has been called. Do not push, 
touch, or otherwise physically interfere with the 
suspect. If you see the item or actually saw him 
. conceal it, you should attempt to delay him by block-
ing his path as discreetly as possible. PoZiteZy ask 
him to wait a moment until a police officer arrives. 
If the individual becomes obstreperous or violent, 
you may not fight with him or physically stop him 
without being in danger of infringing upon his rights 
or getting hurt yourself. You may only actually ar-
rest him if you have a reasonable suspicion that a 
felony has been committed in your presence. You 
should exercise this common law right and duty to 
arrest only in the most compelling of circumstances. 
Note the name and address of the suspect and the time 
of the incident. If you confront or detain a library 
user, have a witness (another employee) there with 
you. 
At my request, the attorney also had one of his assis-
tants review the Code of Virginia to see what laws were ap-
plicable in case we detained someone who was proven innocent 
after a search. I had nightmares of one of us being sued for 
false arrest, and feared a staff member would be reluctant to 
confront someone suspected of theft if the staff member knew 
he was personally liable in a case of false arrest. 
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The check of the Code revealed that there were no 
applicable laws in the Conunonwealth which offered to librar-
ians and archivists the protection granted to merchants de-
taining someone suspected of shoplifting. The university 
attorney innnediately drafted legislation to cover this situa-
tion, and sent it to us for our review. I went over the 
proposed legislation with my faculty, and we submitted a 
number of changes to the attorney, chiefly to the definition 
of library materials. The old definition in the Code was 
useless, as it did not mention many types of materials conunon-
ly held in libraries today. The bill was polished up and re-
turned to me with the suggestion that I ask a delegate to 
introduce it. The University had a number of other bills in 
which it was interested and did not wish to spread its in-
fluence too far. 
With some trepidation, I sent the bill and a letter 
of explanation to our local representative. He was most 
cooperative. We got the bill into the hopper just ahead of 
the deadline for submission to the 1975 annual session of 
the General Assembly, and were fortunate to have it pass 
both houses and be signed by the governor. The bill makes 
concealment of library property a crime. As "proof of the 
willful concealment • • • shall be prima facie evidence of 
intent to conunit larceny thereof." More important from our 
point of view is the section entitled "Exemption from lia-
bility for arrest of suspected person." 
A library or agent or employee of the library 
causing the arrest of any person pursuant to the 
provisions of §.42 .1-73 [the section on concealment] 
shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful de-
tention, slander, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, or assault and battery 
of the person so arrested ••• provided that, in 
causing the arrest of such person, the library or 
agent or employee of the Library had at the time 
of such arrest probable cause to believe that the 
person conunitted willful concealment of books or 
other library property. [The full text of the bill 
appears on pages 18 and 19.) 
We feel that we are rather well protected in dealing 
with a reader concealing something ·prior to leaving with it. 
The bill does not make a confrontation situation easier, but 
it does give the staff some confidence that in such a situa-
tion they have support for their actions, provided they 
proceed carefully. 
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The topic of publicity of a theft from an institu-
tion is an important and difficult one. Although our staff 
for several months had concealed the news of the theft and 
the searches being conducted, it seemed inevitable that word 
would get out and reach the press. We believed we should 
be in a far stronger position to control the story if we 
released it ourselves, and released it rather than waiting 
to be confronted. In most respects, I think we were right, 
Virginians were stunned to realize we had manuscripts and 
rare books so valuable that someone would wish to steal 
$125,000 worth. By and large, press reaction was sympathet-
ic. There were a few critical reports aimed at our apparent 
lack of security, which we fueled by letting slip through in 
our press release one statement that was easily misinterpreted. 
For many years, libraries and archives have not wished 
to publicize thefts because it was felt that knowledge of a 
theft would cause potential donors to withhold their gifts 
In some instances, institutions have been unwilling to pro-
secute thieves because the publicity of a trial would have 
revealed the theft. This attitude has eased the work of 
thieves. Without public announcement of missing ~aterials, 
dealers sometimes purchased stolen materials unwittingly. 
A dishonest collector was willing to purchase materials 
that he might have shied from were it well known they had 
been stolen from an institution. 
At this time, I do not 
that we have failed to acquire 
felt our security was not good 
be some who have not told us. 
know of a single collection 
because the potential donor 
enough. Of course, there may 
Other donors did ask about the 
theft in the months after our announcement, but their ques-
tions were sympathetic ones resulting from curiosity. I 
am convinced that the publicity of the theft did have posi-
tive benefits for our collecting program. We gained public 
consciousness of our repository as no report of an accession 
ever had, or probably ever will. 
The worst risk run by publicizing a theft, in my 
opinion, is that the thief may feel the publicity has de-
stroyed his market for the stolen property, leaving him no 
alternative but destruction of the material. This was a 
major concern of the University of Virginia in making the 
decision to publicize our theft as widely as possible. 
Since we have not to this date recovered any of our stolen 
material, it is possible that the thief or thieves did 
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destroy it. We may never know. But we felt that the benefits 
of publicity outweighed the risk. 
Breaking with the old tradition of concealment of a 
theft was an important step. More honesty about theft from 
archives and libraries is needed. The country is in the 
midst of a major crime wave involving archives and libraries, 
but only archivists and librarians seem to be aware of it. 
Publicity will help, for the more responsible people who are 
aware of our security problem, the more assistance we shall 
receive in dealing with it. One excellent sign of support is 
the $90,000 grant to the Society of American Archivists from 
the National Endowment for the Humanities to fund a number of 
proposals for specific programs on archival security. 
My involvement with archival security has not been 
a pleasant one. It has been instructive but not in ways 
that I should have preferred to mark my career. I am glad 
to be involved in archival security from a more objective 
and useful perspective, and I hope and expect that the next 
paper that I write on this subject will not have to carry 
the qualifying phrase of this one in its title. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 
1. That § §42.1-72 and 42.1-73 of the Code of 
Virginia are amended and reenacted and the Code 
of Virginia is amended by adding sections numbered 
42.1-73.1and42.1-74.1 as follows: 
§ 42.1-72. Injuring or destroying books and other 
property of libraries. -Any person who willfully, 
maliciously or wantonly writes upon, injures, de-
faces, tears, cuts, mutilates, or destroys any book 
or other library property belonging to or in the 
custody of any public, county or regional library, 
the State Library, other repository of pub I ic records, 
museums or any library or collection belonging to 
or in the custody of any educational, eleemosynary, 
benevolent, hereditary, historical library or patri-
otic institution, organization or society, shall be 
guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor. 
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§ 42.1 -73. Concealment of book or other prop-
erty while on premises of library ; removal of book 
or other property from library. -Whoever, without 
authority, with the intention of converting to his 
own or another's use, willfully conceals a book or 
other library property, while still on the premises 
of such library, or willfully or without authority 
removes any book or other property from any of 
the above libraries or co llections shall be deemed 
guilty of larceny thereof, and upon conviction 
thereof shall be punished as provided by law. Proof 
of the willful concealment of such book or other 
library property while still on the premises of such 
library shall be prima facie evidence of intent to 
commit larceny thereof. 
§ 42.1-73.1 Exemption from liability for arrest 
of suspected person . -A library or agent or em-
ployee of the library causing the arrest of any 
person pursuant to the provisions of §42.1 -73, 
shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful deten-
tion, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, or assault and battery of the 
person so arrested, whether such arrest takes place 
on the premises of the library or after close pursuit 
from such premises by such agent or employee; 
provided that, in causing ~he arrest of such person, 
the library or agent or employee of the iibrary had 
at the time of such arrest probable cause to believe 
-~ that the person committed -willful concealment of 
books or other library property. 
§ 42.1 -7 4.1 "Book or other I ibrary property" 
defined. The terms "book or other library property" 
as used in this chapter shall include any book, 
plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, 
drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, 
broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public 
record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual 
materials in any format, magnetic or other tapes, 
electronic data processing records, artifacts, or other 
documentary, written~ or printed material, regard-
less of physical form or characteristics, belonging 
to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of any 
library, museum, repository of public or other 
records institution as specified in § 42.1 -72. 
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